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Abstract: This paper investigates if decisions to drop out of high school are sub-optimal, 
and whether students benefit from policies, such as a minimum school leaving age, that 
oblige them to finish school beyond the time they choose on their own.  I use changes in 
minimum school-leaving laws in Great Britain and Ireland, which were remarkably 
influential, to measure pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains from education.  I find, similar 
to previous studies, students compelled to take an extra year of schooling experienced an 
average increase of 12 percent in annual earnings.  I also find significant effects from 
education on health, leisure and labor activities, and subjective measures of well-being, 
which hold up against a wide array of specification checks.  Comparing these estimates 
with intertemporal models of educational choice, the main conclusion of this paper is that 
it is very difficult to justify an optimal decision to drop out early without the presence of 
time inconsistent preferences, misguided expectations, or disutility from identifying with 
a social group that considers dropping out the norm.  To prefer dropping out early, the 
one-year cost from attending school would have to exceed a dropout’s maximum lifetime 
annual earnings by a factor of about six. 
 
 
Key Words: social returns to education, identity, happiness, compulsory school laws 
 





I am very grateful to staff members from the UK Data Archive, and to Steve Machin for 
providing me with necessary data for this project.  I also thank Alan Auerbach, David 
Autor, Gregory Besharov, David Card, Liz Cascio, Botond Koszegi, John Quigley, 
Enrico Moretti, Rob McMillan, Justin McCrary, Mathew Rabin, Jesse Rothstein, 
Emmanuel Saez, and Jo Van Biesebroeck for many helpful comments and discussions.  I 





One of the most studied relationships in economics is that between schooling and 
earnings.  A lot of work in the last decade aims to understand whether schooling causes 
earnings, or whether other individual characteristics are related to both factors.  One 
approach, adopted by Angrist and Krueger (1991) uses differences in school-entry laws to 
identify students dropping out with less education because they were born just after the 
entry cut-off date as opposed to just prior.  Students that finished their schooling with 
fewer years in class because of these laws experienced on average 9.2 percent less in 
adult earnings than those dropping out later.  In another study, Acemoglu and Angrist 
(2000) use differences in school-leaving laws across the United States and over time to 
identify adults made to stay in school for different periods before having the option to 
drop out.  Students compelled to take an extra year experienced an average increase of 9.2 
percent in adult earnings.  Harmon and Walker (1995) also examine the effect on earnings 
from changes in minimum school-leaving ages in the United Kingdom.  They estimate 
adult earnings rose an average of 15.3 percent for each additional year of school a student 
had to take.  Recent studies that use other instruments or exogenous controls for 
education arrive at very similar estimates for the financial returns to schooling.  Card 
(2001) provides a nice survey and interpretation of these results. 
Other recent work suggests possible non-pecuniary benefits from education.   
Lochner and Moretti (2001), for example, analyze the effect of high school graduation on 
incarceration using changes in state compulsory attendance laws as an instrument for high 
school completion.  They find substantial reductions in the probability of incarceration 
among whites and blacks that finished high school as a result from these laws.  Lleras-
Muney (2001) also uses compulsory attendance laws to examine the effect of education 
on mortality.  She estimates an additional year of education lowers the probability of 
dying in the next 10 years by 3.6 percentage points (among elderly people). 
These benefits are stunning when considering that all of them are identified by 
constraining some individuals to take more school, whether they want to or not.  A 
traditional model of school choice has students choosing optimal education attainment 
levels at the point where the opportunity and psychological costs from additional  
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schooling outweigh the benefits.  Compulsory schooling laws introduce constraints that 
restrict students’ choices.  With models that assume students behave rationally and are 
time consistent, restricting school choice should lower lifetime welfare among those 
wanting to leave earlier.  But given that the gains from an additional year of education 
may last for many years (and even increase time before death), while most of the costs 
incur over only one year, it is hard not to wonder whether students rationalize school 
attainment decisions by other means. 
Ethnographic studies show very little evidence that youth make education 
attainment decisions in a way to maximize their human capital investment.  A central 
theme from the works of Coleman (1961), Cusick (1972), Everhart (1983), Gordon 
(1957), Hall (1904), Hollingshead (1975), Jackson (1968), Roderick (1993), and Willis 
(1977) is that adolescent concerns about self-image or peer acceptance predominate every 
other concern.  While learning in school may benefit a student, “academic issues are not 
particularly important for prestige maintenance for social groups while, on the other hand, 
athletics, clothes, and being popular are” (Coleman, 1961).  Cusick (1972), for example, 
follows a group of high school students who state to him repeatedly that they would 
rather flunk a test than be denied the opportunity to sit by friends in the lunch-room. 
Dropout prevention policies presume students are better off remaining in school.  
Minimum school-leaving laws are ideal instruments to analyze this presumption’s 
validity because they prevent some students from leaving school when they want to.  In 
fact, the motivation behind introducing such laws often relates to assumptions that 
dropouts do make mistakes.
 1  This paper is the first to undertake a cost-benefit analysis in 
the dropout decision,  and  examine  whether  students  may  benefit from laws, such as a 
minimum school leaving age,  
                                                 
1  The Republic of Ireland school-leaving age changed in 2002 to 16.  Minister for Education and Science, 
Micheal Martin, explained; “We are all too aware of the fact that participation in the education system gives 
the best chance of success – economic, social and personal – in later life.  My aim in this legislation is to 
improve our ability to ensure that children and young people remain within the education system for as long 
as possible” [http://www.irlgov.ie/educ/press/press981016.htm, June 17, 2002].  In North Carolina, State 
Superintendent Michael Ward wants to raise the minimum school-leaving age from 16 to 18.  He argues, “It 
is time to raise the legal school attendance age to 18, an age that better reflects the maturity required to 




that oblige them to finish school beyond the time they choose on their own.  I consider 
whether forgone earnings and possible effort costs from attending school an extra year 
can reasonably offset expected total gains from staying on in school.  I also consider 
alternative models that incorporate different psychological assumptions for making a 
school attainment decision.  Six such law changes in England and Ireland are used to 
measure the present value pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains from an extra year of 
school.  The changes influenced a remarkably large number of students and were 
rigorously enforced.   
Similar to previous studies, I find students compelled to take an extra year of 
school experienced an average increase of 12 percent in annual earnings.  I also find 
students with additional schooling are less likely to report poor health, being depressed, 
looking for work, or being unemployed.  The estimates are robust to regressing over any 
two-nation sample instead of three, or restricting the data to include only Britain’s 
minimum school leaving law change, or Northern Ireland’s change.  The minimum 
school leaving laws affect survey responses from adults who finished schooling before 
age 17, but not after, as we would expect, since those with higher education already 
intended to finish school beyond the minimum dropout age.  Most interesting, adults who 
experienced a higher minimum school-leaving law are more likely to report being 
satisfied overall with the life they lead.  The coefficient on this effect falls less than half 
when income controls are added.  In other words, conditional on reporting the same 
earnings or household income, adults with more education are still likely to report being 
happier in life.   
Whether or not the possibility of non-pecuniary benefits from education are taken 
into account, the main conclusion of this paper is that it is very difficult to justify an 
optimal decision to drop out early without the presence of time inconsistent preferences, 
misguided expectations, or disutility from identifying with a social group that considers 
dropping out the norm.  With financial discount rates ranging from 3 to 8 percent, a 
student’s one-year cost from attending school would have to exceed by 3 to 26 times his 
initial earnings in order to justify a drop out decision.    
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Section II develops a traditional time-consistent and rational model of 
intertemporal choice that assumes forgone earnings and effort are the only costs incurred 
while attending school.  Section III covers the 6 school leaving law changes in England 
and Ireland since 1925.  The data and methodology for identifying the effects of these 
laws and the overall effects from additional education are described in Section IV.   
Returns to schooling estimates are shown in Section V, along with specification checks, 
earnings profile estimates from additional schooling, and present value estimates of the 
gains from additional schooling.  Section VI considers three alternative school choice 
models under different psychological assumptions that may help explain the empirical 
findings.   Conclusions and policy implications are discussed in Section VII. 
 
 
II. Optimal School Choice 
 
In this section, I examine dropout decisions using a time-consistent and rational 
model of intertemporal choice that assumes effort and forgone earnings are the only costs 
incurred while attending school.   
 
A. The base model 
 
The base model for considering school attainment decisions, an extension from 
Card (2000), assumes an individual discounts future consumption geometrically and faces 
possible effort costs.   In year 0, an individual chooses whether to take an additional year 
of school ( 1 = S ), or not ( 0 = S ).  Her lifecycle utility, extending to year T and 
conditional on school choice and a given consumption profile is: 
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Year 0 utility is  ) ( )) 0 ( ( S c u φ − .  The term  )) ( ( t c u  denotes year t utility from 
consumption, which is increasing and concave, and  ) (S φ  is a function that reflects the 
relative disutility from attending school.
2  Per-period utility after year 1 is 
) , ( )) ( ( t S t c u θ + .   ) , ( t S θ  captures the possibility of non-pecuniary utility in year t from 
school.  The individual incurs these benefits independent of changes in consumption from 
income due to school.  She also discounts future utility geometrically at a rate δ .   
I examine the school choice decision with and without liquidity constraints.  If an 
individual can borrow or lend freely at a fixed interest rate r , then the intertemporal 
budget constraint is 
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= , and  ) , ( t S y  is school dependent income in year t.  With known 
benefits and costs from schooling in the first period, but uncertain consequences 
afterwards, an individual’s optimal schooling choice and optimal consumption path 
maximize 
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Solving for the problem’s first-order conditions, the individual’s optimal strategy 
is not to take an additional year of school if the marginal cost from the additional year 
exceeds the present value of the marginal benefit.  That is, the first-order conditions 
imply an individual prefers to drop out if: 
 
                                                 
2  ) (S φ  might be a negative function of  S , in which case an individual would gain utility from attending 

















































) 0 , (
, captures the foregone earnings 
from working full-time relative to that from part-time and summer employment while in 
school (the term is positive).  The second term measures the additional effort costs 
incurred while a student for the additional year.   The benefits from additional schooling, 
on the right-hand side of (4), include the expected present-value earnings gains from 
more education, plus the non-pecuniary benefits, discounted by 
t δ .  A nice feature of 
equation (4) is that both costs and benefits are expressed in currency.  This arises because 
utility is discounted by the shadow price for a unit of year 0 consumption, which is λ . 
Notice if the direct disutility from school is zero and non-pecuniary benefits are 
zero, the decision to continue becomes purely a financial one: when the expected present 
value of earnings exceeds the loss in earnings while in school, the individual takes the 
extra year of school.  Earnings are discounted by 
t R  and not 
t δ  because earnings can be 
used for consumption in any period if no borrowing constraints are faced. 
A worthwhile alternative case to consider is when the individual is liquidity 
constrained.  Suppose that the individual cannot borrow in year 0, the year she must 
decide whether or not to continue school.
3  Under this scenario, the individual chooses 
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Equation (6) is very similar to equation (4), with the main exception that the 
individual’s marginal cost from an additional year of school now includes her disutility 
from less consumption compared to that if she worked and weighted by  *
1
λ
, the inverse 
shadow price for first year consumption. 
To get some idea of the implications from such a model, consider the case when 
δ = R , so that consumption is constant after the first year, and changes in consumption 
from schooling are proportionate to changes in present value earnings (after year 0).  Let 
the yearly marginal benefit from additional schooling be constant, so that 
[] []
S
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, with these benefits beginning in year τ .  
Then we can express the decision rule in terms of the ratio of the initial costs from 
schooling to the annual benefit stream, which is dependent only on R , τ , and T : 
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How much would first year costs have to exceed annual benefits from additional 
school to rationalize dropping out?  Table 1 shows the minimum magnitude of the costs 
to yearly benefits ratio in order to compel an individual to drop out.  If we assume an 
annual stream of benefits for 50 years after the additional year of school, and a discount 
factor of .95 (so  % 2 . 5 = r ), the relative disutility from attending school would have to be 
17.5 times greater than the relative annual gain from school.  Even with lower discount 
rates, or postponing the start of benefits, the ratio seems substantial. 
                                                                                                                                                 
3 The single year liquidity constraint simplifies the discussion but is not a restrictive assumption.  Being 
liquidity constrained for later years leads to similar conclusions.  
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What is the present value stream of benefits from additional school?  My strategy 
is to estimate lifecycle gains in earnings from additional schooling and to estimate how 
much of an increase in subjective well-being from additional school is due to earnings to 
approximate the entire right-hand side of (4) or (6).  Note the empirical estimates of the 
total discounted benefits from education are the same whether one believes the liquidity 





In the base model, a student drops out if the forgone earnings and effort costs 
from continuing another year are larger than the present value financial returns from the 
extra year plus possible non-pecuniary gains.  Compelling a would-be-dropout under this 
model to take the extra year would lower her lifetime expected utility.   
In order to begin to evaluate whether the base model explains dropout behaviour, 
we must consider appropriate discount rates for R  and δ .  The appropriate financial 
discount rate to use is similar to that for treating education as an investment decision.  A 
better depiction of the school-choice model involves choosing between alternative 
earnings distributions.  If a student is risk-neutral, then only differences in expected 
returns matter and a risk-free financial discount rate to convert future expected returns to 
present value should be used.  If a student is risk-averse, higher expected returns from 
additional schooling may matter less if the variance in expected earnings is also higher.   
To assess the degree of risk ideally, we would like to know the counterfactual 
earnings that dropouts would have made had they continued one more year (and vice 
versa).  Without this information, of the small literature that investigates this issue, the 
most common approach to measure riskiness of education involves comparing variances 
of log earnings among different education groups for students with similar characteristics.  
The previous literature focuses on whether earnings uncertainty increases when extending 
schooling beyond high school (e.g. Levhari and Weiss, 1974 and Chen, 2002).  The 
uncertainty from extending a student’s minimum education attainment level by one year,  
 9
however, is not comparable with these earlier estimates since additional high school is 
unlikely to contribute to human capital specialization.   . 
The appendix provides evidence that additional high school is less risky than 
without.  I also find dropouts that faced more restrictive school-leaving ages are less 
likely to be unemployed.  The results support a preference for using a risk-free financial 
discount rate to make present value comparisons.  For sensitivity analysis, I consider a 
range of possible rates: 3 percent, 5 percent, and 8 percent.  All three assumptions 
generate similar conclusions. 
A high geometric time preference rate (a low δ ) raises the weight on effort costs 
and lowers the present value of non-pecuniary education gains.  As mentioned, however, 
values of δ  below 0.90 or even below 0.95 imply changes to a student’s utility more than 
15 years from now are almost inconsequential compared to similar changes that happen 
immediately.  A discount factor can serve as a useful control for future uncertainties such 
as the probability of death or severe illness.  But it seems inappropriate to place so little 
weight on future utility when evaluating the school choice decision.  We would not want 
ourselves to place 5 times more emphasis on our well being at age 15 than our well being 
at age 35 when making school attainment decisions.  We would not want others to use 
this as their welfare weighting criteria.  O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001) make a similar 
argument for evaluating how youth should evaluate intertemporal decisions in general.  A 
student should evaluate her school attainment decision with a δ  close to one if she wants 
to account for expected consequences of her decision when of working age and when old.     
 
III. Minimum School-Leaving Laws in Great Britain and Ireland 
 
  Legislation from Great Britain’s 1944 Education Act led the school leaving age in 
England, Scotland, and Wales to rise in 1947 from 14 to 15 years.
4  In 1973, the leaving 
age increased again to 16 years.  Figure 1 displays the remarkable effect these laws had on 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed analysis of the history of British education and the 1944 Education Act in particular, 
see Halsey, Heath and Ridge (1980).  The authors argue, “the 1944 Act put a legislative stamp on forty 
years of progress towards separate, competitive, and free secondary education for all”.  Although other 
reforms were included in the Act, the changing of the school-leaving age in 1947 had, by far, the most 
sudden and influential impact on students.  
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early dropout rates.  Before 1947, a very high fraction of children left full-time school at 
age 14 (or less).  Over just three years however – between 1945 and 1948 – the portion of 
14 year-olds leaving school falls from about 57 percent to less than 10 percent.
5  The 
1947 change seems to have little effect on the fraction of children leaving school at age 
15 or less – virtually everyone wanting to drop out at age 14, dropped out at age 15 after 
the change.  By 1971, the fraction of 15 year-olds leaving school at age 15 or less is 30 
percent.  Two years later, the fraction drops to 8 percent, corresponding with the school-
leaving age rising from 15 to 16 in 1973. 
  The prime motivation for increasing the school leaving age was to ‘improve the 
future efficiency of the labour force, increase physical and mental adaptability, and 
prevent the mental and physical cramping caused by exposing children to monotonous 
occupations at an especially impressionable age’ [Halsey et al., (1980, p. 126)].  Support 
for raising the school-leaving age was widespread for many years before the legislation 
was enacted.  Most in favor stressed the new law would diminish the number of jobs with 
few promotion opportunities while expanding the nation’s aggregate human capital.   
Opposition for the change was mainly driven by concerns with short-run reductions in the 
supply of juvenile labor (O’keefe, 19??).
6 
  The 1947 Education Act in Northern Ireland was closely modeled on the British 
one.  The rise in the school-leaving age, from 14 to 15, however, was not implemented 
until 1957.  Figure 2 charts the proportion of youths aged 14 dropping out, and the 
proportion dropping out at 15 or less.  A clear break occurs for the portion of early 
school-leavers in 1957.  Both the fraction of school-leavers aged 14 and 15 in 1957 fall 
discontinuously.  The influence on school attainment from the other school-leaving age 
change, from 15 to 16 in 1973, is clearly visible. 
In the Republic of Ireland, the minimum school-leaving age did not change to 15 
from 14 until 1972.  Figure 3 displays the fraction of school-leavers at age 14 or less and 
age 15 or less.  The downward trend of the early dropout rate declines at a fairly constant 
                                                 
5 The finding that some adults reported finishing school at age 14, even after the school-leaving age had 
changed, likely reflects measurement error, noncompliance, or delayed enforcement.  
6 The relatively high dropout rate in Britain remains the topic of much research and policy analysis (e.g. 
Micklewright et al., 1989).  British researchers are debating whether to raise the minimum school leaving 
age from 16 to 17.  
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rate.  The law change in 1972 does not seem to have affected school leaving patterns.  




IV. Empirical Approach and Data 
 
The changes in minimum school-leaving laws presented above are combined to 
identify the effects of additional schooling on earnings, subjective well-being, and other 
outcomes.  This section presents the methodology to estimate these effects and to convert 
projected earnings profiles into present value.  The data is discussed at the end of this 
section.   
 
 
A. Measuring Returns to School 
 
The reduced form analysis examines the effect the British and Irish minimum 
school-leaving laws had on particular outcomes – earnings in particular.  Define  ijklmn y  as 
an outcome variable for individual i, at survey age  j , from birth cohort k , from nation 
l, surveyed in year m , and finished full time schooling at age n.  Since the level of 
dropout-age variation is not at the individual level but at the birth cohort and nation level, 
outcomes are first grouped into cell means.  Define  jklmn y  as the mean outcome for 
individuals within cell i,  j ,  k ,  l, and m .  To correct for serial correlation, all 
regressions are further clustered by nation, and weighted by group cell sample size.  The 
baseline reduced form regression equation is: 
 
(8)   jklmn lm k j kl kl jklmn e e e e drop drop y + + + + + = 16 15 2 1 γ γ , 
 
                                                 
7  The Republic of Ireland school-leaving age changed in 2002 to 16.    
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where  kl drop15  and  kl drop16  are indicator variables for whether a birth cohort from 
nation  l may leave school at age 15 or age 16 respectively.  The omitted variable 
indicates whether a cohort may leave school at age 14.  The terms  j e  and  k e , are age and 
birth cohort fixed effects.  I also include nation fixed effects interacted with survey year, 
to accommodate inflation and different business cycles across nations.  Survey year fixed 
effects are only possible by allowing them to differ by nation, while not allowing birth 
cohort effects to differ by nation.  The remaining error term,  jklmn e , is assumed identically 
and independently distributed.  Only individuals aged 18 to 65 are included in the 
analysis.
8  Huber-Eicker-White standard errors are clustered by nation in all estimates. 
Equation (8) uses more than time discontinuities to identify the effects from 
school-leaving laws.  Time trends in the outcome variable are controlled for with birth 
cohort and nation fixed effects.  Identifying the effects from school-leaving laws comes 
from differences in the timing of these laws across nations.  The analysis is therefore 
similar to difference-in-difference estimation, but with more than one intervention and 
more than one ‘treatment group’.  The effects from school-leaving laws are not identified 
if time trends in the outcome variable vary by nation.  Several specification checks are 
carried out in Section IV to examine this possibility. 
  The baseline instrumental variable equation is: 
 








jklmn S  is the predicted mean school attainment from estimating 
jklmn lm k j kl kl jklmn e e e e drop drop S + + + + + = 16 15 2 1 γ γ   by instrumental variables.  
IV B  is 
the instrumental variable estimate for the returns to schooling on the outcome variable 
(identified by those affected by the law changes). 
                                                 
8  Questions about labor market earnings in one of the surveys used are asked only to adults aged 65 or less.  
Alternative age restrictions do not change the findings.  
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Earnings data for this study comes mainly from the British and Northern Irish 
General Household Surveys (discussed below).  But these surveys do not include a 
Republic of Ireland sample, and the earliest overlapping survey year is 1985.  This means 
varying effects of education on earnings for adults younger than age 42 cannot be 
identified from these surveys using equation (9).  The reason is, regardless of location, 
younger birth cohorts in 1985 faced the same minimum school-leaving age.  To explore 
the possibility of varying returns to education by age, I also consider dropping the birth 
cohort fixed effects in (9), which allows me to identify the effects of education from 
changing the minimum school-leaving age to 16 in 1972, both in the UK and Northern 
Ireland.  I then interact the school-leaving age instruments with three age group dummy 
variables: 35 to 44, 45 to 54, and 55 to 65 (the omitted dummy being 25 to 34), but for 
only those that finished school after age 14.  This model allows the return to education for 
adults leaving school at age 15 or greater, relative to those at age 14, to vary at 10 year 






I use three different sets of surveys.  The advantage with using the British Labor 
Force Surveys is that they are very large, but, unfortunately, they are without earnings 
information prior to 1993.  The British and Northern Ireland General Household Surveys 
include several years of individual and family income data for the UK, but limited 
earnings variables for Northern Ireland.  The advantage with using the Eurobarometer 
Surveys is that they contain measures of subjective well-being and include data for the 
Republic of Ireland.  The disadvantage is that they report family, not individual earnings.   
 
i. General Household Surveys 
 
                                                 
9The STATA code for generating the data for this study is available on request.  All surveys used are 
available through UK Data Archive.  
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I match 15 UK General Household Surveys (GHHS), from 1983 to 1998, to 13 
Northern Ireland Continuous Household Surveys, from 1985 to 1998.  I shall refer to both 
as General Household Surveys, since both questionnaires are almost identical.  The major 
difference is that earnings information from the UK GHHS is coded exactly, while 
earnings are grouped into categories in the NI GHHS.  Both include information about 
household income, individual earnings, unemployment status, general health status, 
leisure activities, and age completed full time education.  Average earnings are assigned 
for Northern Irish individuals within grouped earnings categories.  The combined dataset 
contains 321,656  individuals aged 18 to 65, although not every survey year contains the 
same questions.  Only British born adults are included, however, foreigners living in 
Northern Ireland are not identified.   
 
ii. Labor Force Surveys 
 
I combined 32 annual and quarterly Labour Force Surveys (LFS) between 1985 
and 1998 to create a large sample of 2,411,502 native born adults aged 18 to 65, with 
2,425,296 from Great Britain, and 86,206 from Northern Ireland.  The LFS contains 
information on employment, disability, and income after 1993.  
 
iii. Eurobarometer Surveys 
 
The Eurobarometer Surveys began in 1970 by the Commission of the European 
Community, and are designed to track opinions, attitudes, and subjective satisfaction 
among members of the EC.  Each survey contains a sample of about 1,000 nationally 
representative individuals per country.  Northern Ireland is treated separately from Great 
Britain, with a sample of about 300 per survey.  Surveys are carried out more than once a 
year, from 1973 to 1998.  A total of 50 surveys are combined to create a dataset with 
87,475 individuals aged 18 to 65 from Great Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and 
Northern Ireland.  Some of the more useful variables include respondents’ age when they 
finished full-time school; self-reports of unemployment; family income (measured in  
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brackets), and a measure of subjective well-being.  Each survey asks, “On the whole, are 
you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life 
you lead?”  And about half of the surveys ask, “Taking all things together, how would 
you say things are these days – would you say you’re very happy, fairly happy, or not too 
happy these days?”  Family income amounts are assigned according to the average 
between the upper and lower earnings bracket an individual is in. 
 
C. Assessing School Leaving Decisions with Subjective Well-Being Measures 
 
While many social scientists rightly worry about the validity of such measures to 
proxy for utility or stable states of happiness, estimating the returns to education on 
subjective happiness provides additional insight on drop out decisions.  Monetary gains 
from education may have little affect on overall well-being.  Non-monetary gains from 
education may have a large influence.  The instrumental variables approach identifies an 
effect of additional schooling on self-reported well-being only if those constrained to take 
an extra year of schooling are more likely to report being satisfied with life than those 
unconstrained, controlling for age, nation, birth cohort, and survey year.   
 “A large array of evidence has shown that subjective survey questions are prone 
to significant reporting error.  For example studies have found that the placement of well-
being questions affects how they are answered.  If they are preceded by a question that 
asks about dating behavior, people are more likely to report unhappiness.  Beyond order 
choice, instantaneous mood at the time of the survey is also found to have a large effect 
on how people answer such questions.  Schwarz and Strack (1999) provide a nice survey 
of these effects. 
  Yet such results only tell us that there is measurement error in these questions.  
What is more relevant for the purposes of this study is that the evidence is clear that these 
questions also contain significant true signals of well-being.  Evidence of this kind comes 
in several varieties but they all follow a similar methodology: Find a more objective 
measure of well-being and see how well they correlate with the self-report.  And strong 
positive correlations have been found for a dramatic set of such variables.  For example,  
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outsider’s assessments of a person’s happiness or independent counts of smiles correlate 
positively.  Moving to much more physiological measures, everything from heart rate, 
blood pressure to even level of activity in the left versus right prefrontal lobe all are found 
to correlate with subjective reports of well being (Kahneman 1999).  These studies all 
suggest that despite the measurement error inherent in this attitudinal question, it 
nevertheless correlates effectively with well-being.” 
The range of information used for judging subjective well-being may extend 
beyond an individual’s current year status.  Ross, Eyman, and Kishchuck (1986), for 
example, asked respondents what information they used in determining subjective well-
being responses.  Explicit references to ones’ momentary affective state accounted for 41 
to 53 percent of the reasons that various samples of adult Canadians provided for their 
reported well-being, followed by future expectations (22 to 40 percent), past events (5 to 
20 percent), and social comparisons (5 to 13 percent).  In the context of this paper’s 
school choice analysis, adults factoring in the cost incurred while attending school would 
reinforce positive estimates of an effect on happiness from schooling, since doing so 
would make them less likely to react positively to additional school.  I suppose that this is 
not the case, and assume adult subjective happiness,  ) , ( t S h , is a function of adult 
lifecycle utility and instantaneous utility:   
 
(10) ) ), , ( ), , ( ( ) , (
* ε t S u t S V f t S h = , 
 
where  [] ) , ( )) , ( ( ) , (
1
* t S t S c u t S V
T
t
t θ δ β + = ∑
=
, and ε  is a measurement error term with 
mean zero.  Substantial analytical simplification occurs by assuming the annual gains 
from additional school are constant, so that  ) ( ) , ( S h t S h = .  The happiness response is 
then independent of the weight an individual places on instantaneous or adult lifecycle 
utility. The most cogent results occur from using an indicator variable for life satisfaction, 
so that  1 ) , ( = t S h  if the individual is satisfied with life overall, and  0 ) , ( = t S h  otherwise.  
This specification simplifies the measure’s interpretation.  The individual is satisfied with  
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life if period utility exceeds a particular threshold, η .  Let  {} x 1  be an indicator function, 
equal to one if x is true, zero otherwise.  Then, 
 
(11)  [] {} η ε θ ≥ + + = ) ( )) ( ( 1 ) ( S S c u S h . 
 
The expectation of  ) (S h  is the probability that an individual is satisfied with life.  
The change in the probability that an individual is satisfied with life from additional 
schooling, 
 
(12)  [] [ ] {} [] {} η θ η θ ≥ + − ≥ + = − ) 0 ( )) 0 ( ( Pr ) 1 ( )) 1 ( ( Pr ) 0 ( ) 1 ( c u c u h h E , 
 
is the coefficient estimate, 
IV β ,  from equation (2) when  jklmn y  is the mean happiness 




A. OLS and IV Estimates 
 
  Least squares and instrumental variable estimates for the returns to schooling on 
earnings and income using all three surveys are shown in Table 2.  All regressions include 
fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year.  Data are 
grouped into means by age, sex, birth year, nation, survey year, and age finished full time 
schooling.  Huber-Eicker-White standard errors are shown from clustering for nation. 
Columns 1 and 2 give the reduced form results from regressing earnings on the 
variables indicating whether individuals were allowed to leave school at age 15 or 16.  
Without observations from the Republic of Ireland, the GHHS and LFS are not able to 
identify the effect from a school leaving age of 16, since the change occurred in the same 
year for Britain and Northern Ireland.  The first-stage effects of minimum school-leaving 
laws on education attainment are large enough (see previous figures) to observe a large  
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reduced form effect.  Individuals not able to leave school until age 15 received, on 
average, 6 percent higher earnings than those able to leave school at age 14.  Those 
constrained by a school-leaving age of 16 experienced even larger increases in earnings. 
 The instrumental variable (IV) returns to schooling estimates under column (5) 
are similar across surveys, ranging from 12.4 to 13.8 percent.  These results are also 
comparable to those found by Harmen and Walker (1995).  The ordinary least squares 
(OLS) returns to schooling estimates are lower, but the sample behind these include 
adults in all education attainment categories, whereas identification in the IV case comes 
from only those affected by the law changes.  When OLS estimates are taken for only 
those who finished schooling before age 17, the coefficients are similar to the IV ones, 
suggesting returns to schooling were higher at lower levels of education. 
The results in Table 3 show other effects from schooling.  Health outcomes are 
clearly associated from the minimum school-leaving age changes, corroborating with 
Lleras-Muney’s (2002) finding that schooling lowers mortality.  The GHHS questionnaire 
asks respondents to self report whether they are in good, fair, or poor health.  A one-year 
increase in schooling lowers the probability of reporting being in poor health by 3.7 
percentage points, and raises the chances of reporting being in good health by 8.2 
percentage points.  Additional schooling reduces the chances of having a work-restricting 
disability, which includes depression. 
Schooling seems to affect many labor market outcomes in addition to earnings.  In 
all three datasets, individuals compelled to drop out later are less likely to work in blue 
collar, unskilled manual occupations and more likely to work in service sector and semi-
skilled occupations.  Note that these job composition changes are identified from 
differences in the timing of these changes coinciding with school-leaving age changes 
across the three nations, and not changes over time (birth cohort, age, and survey year 
fixed effects are included in the regressions).  Results from the Labor Force Surveys show 
education reduces the likelihood of receiving unemployment insurance by about half a 
percentage point per year.  Data from the Eurobarometer surveys show adults with an 
extra year of schooling are 1.9 percentage points less likely to self-report being  
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unemployed.  More educated workers are also less likely to actively seek employment 
elsewhere.  
Table 4 shows the effect of education on subjective well-being.  The first row uses 
the Eurobarometer life-satisfaction variable, assigning a value of 1 if an individual reports 
being not at all satisfied with life, 2 if not satisfied, 3 if fairly satisfied, and 4 if very 
satisfied.  Life satisfaction increased for those who faced more restrictive minimum 
school-leaving laws.  From column (4), IV estimates find one year of additional schooling 
increases the likelihood of being overall satisfied with life by 5.4 percent, and increases 
the likelihood of being very satisfied by 2.4 percent.  The IV coefficient estimates are 
similar to the OLS ones.  Adults from the Eurobarometers that faced higher school-
leaving ages are also happier.  Those with additional schooling are more likely to report 
being very happy or fairly happy, compared with those with less schooling. 
 
 
B. Specification Checks 
  
The results above are dramatic.  I find adults who attained more education 
because of minimum school-leaving law changes experienced not only increases in 
earnings, but lower unemployment, better health, job satisfaction, and higher rates of 
happiness and life satisfaction.  Identification of these influences comes from differences 
in the timing of the school-leaving laws across nations.  As mentioned last section, if 
nation-specific outcome variables trend coincidently with the school-leaving age changes, 
the coefficient estimates may not correspond with an education effect.  To examine this 
possibility, I run several specification checks in this subsection on the three main 
variables I use to analyze a student’s optimal dropout decision: family income and life 
satisfaction from the Eurobarometers, and individual earnings from the GHHS. 
The Eurobarometer Surveys contain data from 3 nations.  Dropping any one 
nation leaves the other two for a difference-in-difference analysis.  Table 5 shows OLS 
and IV estimates for the returns to education on family income with different country-
comparison groups.  Column (1) shows the baseline results with all nations included, the  
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same ones displayed in Table 2.  Dropping any one country still leaves positive and 
significant estimates of the returns to schooling.  This means a coincidental trend in 
average family income over time by a single nation is not driving the significant results.  
The estimates are less precise, but all within a similar range as the full sample ones. 
Table 6 shows the same analysis, but for subjective well-being.  I use the indicator 
variable for whether a person reports being satisfied overall with life as the dependent 
variable.  This was the variable where education had the most significant effect in Table 
4.  As with the earnings variable, dropping any one nation leaves a significantly positive 
IV estimate from the effect of additional schooling on adult life satisfaction.  The point 
estimates are all similar. 
Another check is to see whether the results hold up after restricting the analysis to 
a smaller time period.  Table 7 shows results from examining the sample of adults aged 
14 between 1925 and 1955, and the sample aged 14 between 1950 and 1960.
10  In the first 
sample, only the school-leaving age change in Britain, from 14 to 15, affected education 
attainment levels.  The IV returns to education estimates on earnings are higher than the 
baseline results and previous estimates, but these are measured somewhat imprecisely.  
The effect of education on life satisfaction is similar for this sample as for the basecase.   
Only Northern Irish from the sample of adults who were 14 between 1950 and 
1970 experienced a change in their minimum school-leaving laws.  The bottom of Table 
7 shows still similar estimates of the effects from education on this sample.  The IV 
returns to schooling on earnings is again fairly high relative to the baseline estimates.  
The effect of education on life satisfaction remains robustly positive. 
School-leaving law changes should not influence education attainment decisions 
for those not intending to drop out as soon as they can.  If increasing school-leaving age 
laws improves earnings and life satisfaction through additional education, then increasing 
the school-leaving age should not affect earnings and well-being of adults never intending 
to drop out early.  Table 8 shows reduced form estimates of school-leaving age indicators 
on the three outcome variables of interest.  As predicted, columns 2 and 3 show adults 
who finished full-time school before age 17 experience higher earnings from facing a 
                                                 
10  Narrowing the time frame further produced similar point estimates, but high standard errors.  
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greater school-leaving age, but adults who finished school after this period are not 
affected.  If some would-be-dropouts facing later school-leaving ages decide to attain 
even more schooling after being compelled to take an extra year, these persons may end 
up in the second sample of adults with higher education attainment.  Then these persons, 
with lower relative earnings than the rest of the sample, should push average earnings 
lower.  This is what I find from the Eurobarometer surveys.  School-leaving age laws 
raise family income for the group who finished schooling before age 17, but lower family 
income for the group with education completed beyond age 16.  Life satisfaction is also 
unaffected by changing school-leaving ages for the sample with higher education.  The 
finding that unconstrained cohorts are unaffected by the law changes also provides 
support that the results are not driven by coincidental changes in economic circumstances, 
legislation changes, or changes in school quality that would also have affected everyone. 
 
 
C. Present Value Gains from Additional Schooling 
 
i) Financial Returns from Schooling 
 
I use the same laws to estimate the expected present value earnings gains implied 
by finishing school at age 16, rather than 15.  As discussed in section IV, instrumental 
variables estimates for the returns to schooling on earnings that use changes in the school 
leaving age in 1947 and 1957 cannot identify the effects of additional schooling for 
earlier ages than 41 in my data.  Since we would like to convert gains to present value, we 
must analyze whether they occur at younger ages.  To do this, I drop birth year fixed 
effects from the regressions to allow identification of the returns to schooling for younger 
years from the minimum school-leaving age change in 1972.  I also calculate earnings 
profiles for males only, to avoid women’s labor supply issues, and use the GHHS British 
sample that contains the most accurate and largest earnings data of the three surveys. 
Figure 4 graphs the log earnings profiles (measured in 1998 British pounds) for 
males leaving school at age 15 and age 16, estimated from least squares regression with 
the sample restricted to those finishing school before age 17.  The regression includes  
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age, age squared, and age cubed, survey year fixed effects, and age finished full-time 
education.  Since these results are used to estimate expected future earnings, I did not 
restrict the sample by looking only at employed or full-time workers.  This may explain 
the steep earnings progression at younger ages.  Those who left school at age 16 earn 12.1 
percent more, each year, than those who left school at age 15.   
The IV earnings profile estimates are virtually the same (shown in Figure 5).  The 
regression used for calculating the profiles is the same as the one used for Figure 4, 
except minimum school-leaving age indicators instrument age finished full-time 
education.  The implied return to schooling is 12.4 percent.   
The final earnings profile estimate allows for the possibility that the return to 
schooling differs over age.  The regression, for this case, includes additional indicator 
variables for adults aged 35 to 44, 45 to 54, or 55 to 65, who finished school at age 15 or 
more.  The instrumental variables now also include these dummies interacted with the 
school-leaving age dummies.  Figure 6 displays the implied profiles.  The log earnings 
profile for males who left school at 15 has much the same shape as before.  Returns to 
schooling for adults leaving school at 16, relative to those leaving at 15, are larger in 
earlier than in later years.  The estimated return to schooling for 27 to 34 year olds (and 
projected back to 16 year-olds) is 15.7 percent.  The return to schooling estimated for 35 
to 44 year-olds is 10.2 percent.  The return to schooling then falls for later ages, to 5.2 
percent and 0.4 percent for ages 45 to 54 and 55 to 65 respectively.   
Table 10 converts these amounts to present value (to age 15), using discount rates 
of 3, 5, and 8 percent.  The average present value (PV) differences in projected lifetime 
earnings between adults who left school at 16 and those who left at 15 are shown in 
columns 3 to 5.  The PV gains generated from all three regressions are similar.  For the IV 
estimates assuming a constant rate of return from schooling, men leaving school at 16 
earned, on average, 31,907 pounds more than men leaving school at 15, assuming a 
discount rate of 3 percent.   
Compare this amount with the financial opportunity cost of staying in school for 
an additional year.  Column (1) shows the average earnings men who left school at age 15 
receive, between age 16 and age 20.  Under a 3 percent discount rate, average PV gains  
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from the additional year of school are 6.5 times greater than a student’s financial 
opportunity cost (in row 2).  Even with a 5 percent discount rate, PV gains from 
schooling are still 4.4 times greater than earnings predicted after finishing school.   
Another way to get a sense of the relative size of the predicted gains from additional 
education, is to compare them with the maximum annual earnings an individual who left 
school at age 15 receive.  Using the IV projections with a constant return to schooling, the 
PV financial gains from education for a persons taking one more year of schooling are 
almost twice as large as the maximum lifetime earnings that person would make if they 
did not take the extra year, assuming a 5 percent discount rate, and more than 4 times as 
large assuming a 1 percent discount rate. 
 
ii) Non-financial Returns from Schooling 
 
In the base model from section II, optimal school attainment may depend on 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains.  Allowing for non-financial benefits from education 
(such as being less likely to lose one’s job, more likely to be happy with one’s 
occupation, and less likely to commit crime) further raises the total benefits from more 
schooling.  The evidence in Table 9 suggests such benefits may be considerable. 
The IV coefficient in column 1 from regressing an indicator for life satisfaction on 
education captures the increase in probability that education raises utility by an 
unspecified threshold.  If income was the only factor influencing this variable, then, 
conditional on having the same income (and present value wealth), the coefficient should 
fall to zero.  To check this, column 3 adds a complete set of family income group 
dummies for the IV regression from the Eurobarometer Surveys.  Conditional on 
reporting being in the same family income bracket, the probability of reporting life 
satisfaction still rises by 4.3 percentage points.  A potential problem with this analysis is 
that persons with more schooling in the highest income brackets may still have more 
family income, on average, than persons with less schooling in the highest brackets (and 
vice versa).  Column 4 attempts to address this by removing all individuals from the  
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highest and lowest brackets.  Conditional on being in the same family income bracket, the 
coefficient of education on well-being still falls only by 40.2 percent. 
If we assume no remaining omitted variables bias, the result suggests that 40 
percent of the gains in life satisfaction from additional schooling are attributable to 
income, while the other 60 percent to non-pecuniary benefits.  If financial and non-
financial outcomes were perfectly substitutable, an equivalent total gain from education 
would be to add 150 percent of the income portion of benefits to total benefits, and 
reduce non-pecuniary benefits to zero.  Perfect substitutability underestimates the amount 
of income required for equivalent compensation if  )) ( ( S c u  and  ) (S θ  are concave.   
Without it, equivalent compensation would be higher. 
These estimates for the importance of non-pecuniary returns are back-of-the-
envelope.  Ideally, we’d like a second instrument for income or some other means to 
identify income effects on self-reported well-being independent of education effects.   
Nevertheless, taken together with the wide range of variables that seem to change with 
extra schooling, the results are suggestive education has more than just a monetary 
impact.   
Non-pecuniary results simply reinforce the size of the estimates for the gains from 
schooling.  The last three columns of Table IV convert the total benefit from an additional 
school year into a compensating differential, measured in present value at age 15 by 
dividing the financial gains in columns 3 to 5 by 0.4.  The total gains from school are, of 
course, larger.  With a 5 percent discount rate, for example, total gains for dropping out 1 
year later are more than 10 times larger than predicted earnings the first year out, and 
more than 4 times larger than a dropout’s projected peak annual earnings. 
 
iii) Lower expected returns to schooling 
   
A possible criticism with the above calculations is that expected returns may have 
been lower at the time school attainment decisions were made.  Gottchalk and Smeeding 
(1997) and others document sizable increases to the college/high school wage premium  
in the United States and the United Kingdom over the 1980s and 1990s.  The premium  
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rose from about 20 percent in the 1980s to 30 percent by 1995 (Brunello, Comi, and 
Lucifora, 2002).  Whether a rise also in the return to education at lower levels of 
education attainment occurred remains less clear.  Figure 8 shows least squares estimates 
for the returns to education on log family income from 1975 to 1996, using the 
Eurobarometer Surveys.  Only males with ages 18 to 65 who completed full time 
education between ages 14 to 17 are used in the sample.  From 1975 to 1984, the 
estimates ranged between about .10 and .14, and afterwards from about .12 to .16.   
Estimates from the 1984 to 1996 General Household Surveys range by about 4 percentage 
points, with no consistent upward or downward trend.  Using the school leaving age 
change in Britain, Chevalier et al. (2002) find remarkably consistent estimates over time 
using adult males from the British Family Expenditure Survey.  They find estimated 
returns to education on earnings remained between 13 and 16 percent from 1978 to 1995. 
While there appears no significant reason to believe expected returns to education 
differed at the time individuals made school choice decisions in my data, compared to 
average actual returns realized later, I cannot rule out the possibility.  But even assuming 
an expected return of 8 percent above the earnings profile of a student dropping out at age 
15, the present value gains are substantial.  The last row of Table 10 shows estimated 
present value gains from schooling, assuming a constant 8.0 percent return, instead of the 
constant 12.1 percent estimated return in row 2.  Using a 5 percent discount rate, present 
value financial returns are 2.7 times greater than the estimated earnings one year out of 
school, and greater than the average maximum annual earnings for a dropout at age 44.  
Present value gains are even higher if accounting for any future non-pecuniary benefits.   
 
iv) Heterogeneous returns to schooling 
 
  The results estimate average treatment effects from additional schooling.  They do 
not imply every dropout faces high opportunity costs from leaving.  But if some fraction 
of the sample was unaffected by the school-leaving age change, the returns for those who 
were affected must be higher.  Suppose 30 percent of students should expect no gain from 
addition education.  The remaining fraction’s average treatment effect is  7 . / ˆ IV β , where  
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IV β ˆ  is the total sample instrumental variables estimate for the returns to education on 
earnings.  Using this estimate for the returns to schooling for those who would gain, the 
present value earnings benefit, with a 5 percent discount rate, is £31,622 instead of 
£21,540 – now more than 2.5 times a dropout’s average annual salary age 44, without 
accounting for non-pecuniary gains.    
VI. Why do dropouts drop out? 
 
A. Education as an Investment in Human Capital 
 
Can the base model for choosing education attainment to maximize lifetime 
utility, presented in section II explain actual dropout behaviour from the empirical results 
above?  Without liquidity constraints, equation (4) says students should dropout if their 
forgone earnings and effort costs exceed the expected present value of benefits from an 
extra year.  For a likely majority of UK students in the mid-20
th Century, Table 10 implies 
one-year attendance costs would have to exceed at least 3 to 7 times forgone earnings to 
prefer dropping out.  In other words, even before taking into account non-pecuniary 
returns from schooling, these students would have to value effort costs from attending 
school by at least £16,633 – more than their expected maximum lifetime annual salaries – 
in order to prefer dropping out (using a 5 percent discount rate).  Including possible non-
pecuniary health and lifestyle benefits from schooling, the costs would have to be much 
larger.  With liquidity constraints, as in equation (6), the interpretation is slightly 
different.  The expected present value gains from schooling must be offset by the utility 
loss from forgone earnings while attending school plus effort costs.  As a possible 
baseline estimate, suppose that 30 percent of UK would-be-dropouts can expect no gain 
from additional education and financial gains for those that do benefit are half the value 
of total gains.  Using a 5 percent discount rate, utility loses from forgone earnings and 
effort costs for one year in school must be worth more than  £63,244 among students that 
would gain, in order for them, under the base model, to prefer dropping out. 
Reducing borrowing constraints or psychic disutility from attending school would 
constitute substantially effective and inexpensive policies to benefit students by  
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encouraging them to stay on if the base model held true.  It seems unlikely, however, that 
attendance costs could be as large as the empirical results imply.  In fact, I find no 
evidence that liquidity constraints or attendance costs play a significant role in drop out 
decisions.      The 1990 Eurobarometer Youth Survey asks several specific questions 
about youth’s education goals and attainment decisions.  The survey allows a comparison 
of 15 year olds in Britain, who report wanting to finish school at age 16 (the earliest age 
possible) with 16 year olds not in school who report they finished “immediately, after 
dropout age”.  Under the base model, period utility should rise for dropouts after leaving 
school, since effort and liquidity costs fall to zero.  We might expect to also observe self-
reported well-being higher for youth leaving school immediately after the dropout age 
than for youth having to wait another year.  We do not.  In Table 11, average well-being 
is lower among 16 year old males and females who left school at age 16 in contrast to 15 
year olds who report they plan to leave school at age 16.  More than 90 percent of 15 
year-olds wanting to drop out at 16 report being satisfied overall with life, but only 80 
percent are satisfied among 16 year olds who finished school.  Average well-being falls 
for similar aged youth unaffected by the dropout age, but not by as much.   
  About 26 percent of students in my sample of 15 year olds who say they plan to 
leave at age 16 report financial difficulty.  But finishing school does not appear to 
improve their situation.  The fraction reporting being in a difficult financial position 
among 16 year olds out of school is 37 percent.  Obviously the transition from school to 
work may affect how individuals respond to these questions.  But finding that individuals 
respond being worse off financially and emotionally after leaving school suggests the 
costs while constrained to stay in school may not be so high.  More than 50 percent of 16 
to 25 year olds leaving school immediately at the minimum school leaving age said they 
left because they did not like it, or saw no point in going on (Table 12).  Only 12.6 
percent said they needed money, and almost no one said they left because their parents 
needed money or they had to raise a child.  A much higher fraction of youth who left after 
the minimum age said they had gone on as far as they could. 
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B. Self-Identity and Educational Choice 
 
Perhaps we should not be surprised that the base model does poorly in 
predicting dropout behaviour.  As mentioned in the introduction, few studies outside of 
economics describe school choice decisions based on human capital investment alone.  
Of those cited, not one takes seriously the possibility that future expected benefits from 
education plays an important role in determining school choice.  Instead, psychologists 
and ethnographers often point to the importance of a student’s attitude towards school, 
ingrained by their social and cultural background, in influencing her school choice 
decision.   
Gordon (1957), for example, conducted a study in a mid-western high school in 
the 1950s.  He was interested in the premise that the chief motivation of students in high 
school was that of being liked and accepted by peers, and that such motivation in turn 
affected important dimensions of student life.  Gordon concluded that the dominant 
motivation of a student is to maintain a general social status within the organization of the 
school.  Students created their own mechanisms for rewards most important to them.  
Involvement in academic issues was at the minimally accepted level.   
For Everhart (1983), 
 
“Informal organization of students [into social groups] may not facilitate (and 
in fact may detract from) the formal goals of the school.  This is true to the extent that the 
school is established primarily toward the collective education of individual students and 
that attaining this educational level, while it may benefit the individual and increase the 
status of the school, does not necessarily affect directly the status of the informal groups 
of students within the school.  Because of this, academic issues are not particularly 
important for prestige maintenance for social groups while, on the other hand, athletics, 
clothes, and being popular are.  These latter attributes are skills or characteristics borne by 
the students themselves and which can be increased or decreased vis a vis other groups in 
the school.  Academic qualities on the other hand are judged by adult standards and hold 
to individual students rather than groups of students.  It is for these reasons that academic  
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matters, part of the formal structure of the school, often do not correspond with the values 
and goals of the students” (p. 9). 
 
Deviating from behavior common to one’s social group may evoke anxiety and 
discomfort in one’s self and in others, even if such behavior, without considering self-
image, would raise utility.  Many researchers, for example, believe some African-
American students view academic success as a form of “acting white,” (in other words, 
deviating from one’s identity), and that the perceived disutility from deviating from 
parents and friends’ attitudes towards school reduces interest and effort (Cook and 
Ludwig, 1997).  Conversely, many other students may feel obliged to finish college 
because that is what they are told to do by their parents, and that is what their friends plan 
to do.   
To analyze the possible effect of identity, relative to the base model, I incorporate 
recent models by  Akerlof and Kranton (2000,2002).  Define the social group a student 
identifies with in period t as  ) (t I , which may include friends, parents, role models, 
etc….  Let  () )) ( | ( , t I S E S Φ  be a student’s period tutility (or disutility) from attaining 
school level S , relative to the education attainment she perceives is expected of her by 
those she identifies with,  )) ( | ( t I S E .  Her lifetime utility is: 
 
(13) () () [] )) ( | ( , ) , ( )) ( ( )) 0 ( | ( , ) ( )) 0 ( ( ) , (
1
t I S E S t S t c u I S E S S c u t S V
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θ δ φ  
Compared to the base model, the costs associated with extending school and 
going against the opinions of others from one’s identity may dwarf any expected 
independent gains from not dropping out.      
Note that I allow for the possibility that a student’s identity might change.  The 
possibility is not crucial for the argument that self-image concerns may increase a 
student’s likelihood of dropping out, but it does increase this likelihood.  If a student 
identifies with a group that expects her to dropout, but she does not, she initially receives 
disutility from not behaving the same way as others in her group.  Over time, however, 
she may associate with a new social group, or those from her initial group may accustom  
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to her decision.  In both cases, the disutility from school choice deviating from 
anticipated school choice, () )) ( | ( , t I S E S Φ , may diminish with time.  At period 0, 
however, the student may not fully anticipate how her self-image might change if she 
were to take additional schooling.  Suppose, for example, she instead projects her current 
identity when considering her future utility.
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Comparing this identity model with the base model, a student whose social group 
considers dropping out acceptable (and even expected) is more likely to drop out in the 
identity model for two reasons.  First, deviating from her social group’s expectations and 
attitudes would likely generate an immediate disutility.  Second, she may perceive this 
disutility to continue in the future.     
If the discomfort a student gets from exceeding her social groups’ school 
attainment norm predominates her reason for dropping out, then raising the minimum 
school leaving age may increase her lifetime utility.  She no longer would receive 
discomfort from her decision, since her social group’s school attainment norm would also 
adjust from the law change.  Her peers would also face the new dropout age.  Increasing 
the school leaving age would also prevent her from projecting her current state over her 
future.  A student that would choose to continue schooling, where it not for concerns over 
how doing so affects her self-image, would be better off under a higher minimum school 
leaving age policy.   
 
C Hyperbolic Discounting and Educational Choice 
 
                                                 
11 See Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin (2000) for a detailed discussion on projection bias.  
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Two other models may help explain dropout behaviour when the base model 
cannot.  In both cases, a minimum school leaving age increases lifetime welfare.   
The first supposes that students value the future, but when making decisions, they 
value the present temporarily more.  Following Laibson (1997) and O’Donoghue and 
Rabin (1999), one way to incorporate immediate impatience into the school choice model 
is to add a second discount rate placing more relative weight on the current period versus 
all other periods: 
 
(15)  [] ) , ( )) ( ( ) ( )) 0 ( ( ) , (
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In equation (15), a student discounts all consequences beyond the first period from the 
school choice decision by the factor β .  If  1 < β , this quasi-hyperbolic discount factor 
changes the discounting of this period relative to the entire future.  If students could make 
school choice decisions before facing any imminent opportunity cost, they would place 
less weight on these costs than when facing them at the time the decision is actually 
made.  Preferences under such behavior are time inconsistent.  The condition for dropping 
out is if: 
 
























































The more the individual discounts the future, the larger the weight placed on her disutility 
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from effort at school.  Furthermore, a hyperbolic discount rate also lowers the 
significance placed on the non-pecuniary portion of education’s relative benefits.  If the 
student is liquidity constrained the first period, the individual’s optimal strategy is very 
similar to (16), the main exception being that the student’s marginal cost from an 
additional year of school includes her disutility from less consumption compared to that if 
she worked, with more weight placed on this cost when β  is small.
13 
 
D Misguided Expectations and Educational Choice 
 
Another possibility explaining the findings is that a student may systematically 
mispredict her expected gain from additional education.  A student may not make correct 
present value calculations of future returns, or may underestimate the real gains from 
school.  Dominitz and Manski (2000) find substantial variation among high school 
students in earnings expectations conditional on a bachelor degree.  While expectations 
about the returns from a degree were positive, it seems questionable whether would-be-
dropouts can anticipate lifetime gains from one more year of school.  The annual gains 
may seem insignificantly small and ignored when comparing them to a large initial 
burden from staying in school (Rubinstein, 1988).  Guidance from parents who 
themselves dropped out or peers that do not care for school may also lead to misguided 
expectations of returns to school.  With actual expectations below true expectations, 
[] [] . .
~
E E < , the decision to drop out becomes more likely.  A student prefers to drop out if:   
 
                                                                                                                                                 




x g = , is negative.  Finally, using the implicit function theorem, and the fact that 
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VI. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper is to offer an initial empirical analysis for whether 
students optimize lifetime welfare when choosing to drop out of school or not.  I use 
changes in minimum school leaving laws in England and Ireland, which were extremely 
influential, to identify financial and non-financial returns to education.  Minimum school 
leaving age changes provide ideal experiments to examine school choice decisions 
because they compel some students to continue school beyond the level they would 
choose on their own.  I find from this analysis significant lifetime rewards to wealth, 
health, and overall happiness from having to take another year of school.  These results 
collectively summarize and reinforce earlier studies that also estimate substantial benefits 
from education through changes in compulsory schooling. 
The paper tries to measure the present value gain from these flows of benefits 
from schooling.  With a financial discount rate between 3 and 5 percent, present value 
monetary benefits from leaving school one year later are between 5 to 7 times greater than 
average income the first year out of school.  Education may offer additional benefits 
through reducing the likelihood of unemployment, improving health, occupational status, 
and overall attitude towards life.  That the effect of education on raising the probability of 
reporting being satisfied with life falls by less than half when income controls are added 
provides some suggestive evidence that non-pecuniary benefits from education matter.  
Accounting for them raises the estimated total gains from school.  The present value 
calculations assume expected gains from education the same for every would-be-dropout.  
Clearly, earnings potential and human capital accumulation across high school students 
may vary.  But if earnings gains from schooling are lower for some students, earnings 
gains for the other students must be higher than the average gains estimated.  If 30 
percent of students required taking one more year of school experience no gains in  
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earnings, the average treatment effect for the other 70 percent must be 1.43 times higher 
than the overall estimate.  In sum, I estimate that dropouts from the UK in the mid-20
th 
Century would have earned  £26,150 (US$41,000) in present value from continuing an 
extra year, £53,851 (US$84,000) more if including the monetary equivalent from non-
pecuniary gains, and £79,056 (US$123,000) more for 70 percent of the dropouts, if the 
other 30 percent gained nothing (assuming a 5 percent discount rate).  These projected 
earnings are between 2 and 7 times the maximum annual wage for the average high 
school UK dropout. 
There are a two additional underlying assumptions used to reach these 
conclusions.  First, the estimated returns to schooling are individual returns, and do not 
include positive externalities from raising the minimum school-leaving age.  In a paper 
that specifically addresses this issue, Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) find little or no social 
returns to schooling from changes in compulsory schooling in the United States.  Another 
assumption is the true expected return, at the time of decision, equals actual average 
returns found in the data.  If the return rose over time and was unanticipated, the expected 
monetary gains from schooling should be evaluated lower than the amounts calculated 
here.  I provide some evidence that returns to schooling at low levels of education 
remained relatively constant at least since 1972.  But even if we assume an 8 percent 
individual return to schooling, the present value monetary gains from an additional year 
would still be 2.5 times larger than the expected financial opportunity cost (with a 5 
percent discount rate).  This amount exceeds dropouts’ expected maximum lifetime 
annual salary. 
If rewards from additional schooling are so high, why do so many students drop 
out?  The answer to this question has profound policy implications.  It is possible that 
students drop out because forgone earnings and effort costs from attending school are 
higher than the estimated expected benefits.  However, a student not liquidity constrained 
would have to face almost unimaginable mental disutility from attending school.  A 
liquidity-constrained student would have to face extremely high disutility from not being 
able to consume as much as they would if they worked instead.  It seems unlikely that this  
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amount would exceed US$41,000 or more.  I do not find evidence supporting these 
possibilities. 
Several studies point to the importance of a student’s social group in determining 
their active involvement in school.  The central theme from ethnographic and 
psychological research on school life is that seeking peer acceptance and self-identity 
dominate adolescent concerns, even though such social pressures dissipate with time.   If 
the desire to fit in socially prevents a student from otherwise preferring more schooling, 
policies that provide incentives or encourage individuals to pursue additional education 
may not be effective.  Raising the minimum school leaving age may be one way to 
eliminate the disutility from deviating from one’s peers, since all of them face the same 
constraint.    
Another explanation to explain dropout behaviour is that students’ expectations of 
what they gain from taking more school are not in line with true expected gains.  For 
example, an 8 percent annual return seems small and insignificant relative to the one-year 
opportunity cost from not working, which is felt immediately.  Rubenstein (1988) 
proposes individuals ignore small differences like these when making decisions and focus 
on the largest difference when choosing between one option and another.  For this reason, 
perhaps students’ do not make correct present value calculations when making school 
attainment decisions. 
Students may discount the future hyperbolically.  If students could make school 
choice decisions before facing any imminent opportunity cost, they would place less 
weight on these costs than when facing them at the time the decision is actually made.  
Hyperbolic students value the future, but when making decisions, they value the present 
temporarily more.  The model in section II shows how a hyperbolic discount rate 
increases the weight placed on the present, and thus on the monetary and psychic costs 
faced by the student.   
Unless the disutility from attending school or being liquidity constrained 
predominantly explains the findings, the results suggest enforcing compulsory schooling 
can provide an extremely effective (and cheap) means to raise lifetime welfare.  The  
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potential to improve such a large set of social and economic outcomes almost certainly 
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Appendix: Discounting Ex-Post Future Earnings 
 
 
This appendix provides evidence that future earnings associated with an additional 
year of high school are no more risky than future earnings without the extra year.  I 
compare variances of log earnings among groups of students who finished school as early 
as possible under alternative minimum school leaving laws.  The findings provide support 
to prefer using a risk free discount rate in computing the stream of earnings differentials 
from additional schooling to present value. 
To evaluate the high school drop out decision using the school choice models 
presented in the paper, a discount rate is used to convert the flow of earnings differentials 
into present value.  If the flow, conditional on schooling, is certain, then the appropriate 
rate of return is the risk free rate.  The discount rate is chosen so that a one-time monetary 
amount, paid up front, is equivalent to a student’s annual income stream over her lifetime.  
Since the one time amount involves saving for future consumption, rather than 
borrowing, the rate to use is independent of whether an individual is liquidity constrained. 
If a person is risk-averse and future earnings uncertain, we may wish to adjust the 
discount rate to reflect concern about the potential risk involved in the school investment 
decision.  A higher variance associated with future earnings from additional education 
will lower the relative expected utility from it compared to the utility with future earnings 
certain. 
To see this more clearly, consider the base school-choice model in section II when 
the time preference discount factor, δ , equals the financial discount factor, R .  This 
assumption leads to the well-known result that a student attempts to smooth consumption 
over her lifetime.  Suppose also that the student is liquidity constrained at the time the 
school choice is made.  Then the student chooses schooling to maximize the following 
lifetime utility function: 
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) ( ρ .  Since annual earnings for school attainment 
S  at time t are known, they are discounted using the risk-free factor, ρ .  The uncertain 
component,  i ε , has mean zero and variance 1, and is multiplied by a standard deviation 
factor that depends on school attainment. 
  Assuming the function,  [ ] i
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order Taylor series around the point,  0 ) ( = = i i E ε ε , the lifetime utility function can be 
reformulated as: 
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Maximizing with respect to S , the condition for preferring not to continue school is: 
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Using the assumption that 
t t R = δ , and the definition of the shadow price of 
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= , the condition satisfying a drop out decision 
can be rearranged as: 
 










































Equation A4 is comparable to equation 6, except for the second component on the right-








), the decision to drop out becomes more likely than the case when future  
 42
earnings are certain.  When using ex-post future earnings to convert income-streams into 
present value, researchers often correct for uncertainty with a discount rate higher than 
the risk-free rate.  This correction method motivated the use of alternative discount rates 
in this paper.  But an adjustment is necessary only if the variance of outcomes that affect 
utility rise with schooling. 
  Levhari and Weiss (1974) suggest that, from the point of the individual, 
investment in human capital is likely a risky decision.  The main reason is that education 
attainment cannot be bought or sold, which limits the possibility for diversification.  As 
human capital accumulation becomes more specialized, the possibility for avoiding career 
specific shocks diminishes.  The previous literature that investigates these issues focuses 
on the decision whether to extend schooling beyond high school.  But this paper is 
concerned with extending the minimum education attainment by one year – a 
consideration that seems unlikely to increase uncertainty since the additional year seems 
unlikely to contribute to specialization. 
  To measure the change in uncertainty associated with an extra year of high school, 
I adopt the methodology most often used from previous studies, which is to compare the 
variances of log earnings among different education groups for students with similar 
characteristics.  Table A1 shows the variances of log earnings among working British 
males who finished their full-time education the same age as the minimum school-leaving 
age.  The top half of the table compares 52 to 61 year-olds that left school in 1943 to 45 at 
age 14 to those that left in 1949 to 51 at age 15.  The advantage of looking at these two 
groups is that the reason for the difference in education attainment is plausibly 
exogenous, ensuring that the distribution of other background characteristics between 
them are likely similar (see Figure 1). 
  After controlling for survey year and age fixed effects, the annual earnings are 
about 14.6 percent higher, on average, for the group that finished full time education one 
year later.  The difference is similar to that found under the more detailed estimate of the 
return to schooling in the paper.  The log earnings variance for the group that finished 
school at age 15 is considerably smaller than that for the group that finished at age 14.  
The second half of Table A1 shows a similar analysis, but for 29 to 37 year-olds that left  
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school in 1968 to 1970 at age 15 and those that left in 1974 to 76 at age 16.  The 
variances between the first group, that faced a drop out age of 15, and the second group, 
that faced a drop out age of 16, are about the same. 
  The findings indicate those who obtained additional schooling from compulsory 
school legislation changes face less uncertainty associated with their earnings outcomes.  
Table 3 also finds those with additional education are less likely to say they are 
unemployed.  More high school may thus provide a hedge against risk, rather than 
increase it.  A risk-free discount rate (or possibly a lower rate) seems appropriate when 
converting the estimated stream of ex-post annual earnings into present value. 
 Figure 1 









































Notes: The lower line shows the proportion of British-born adults aged 
16 to 65 from the 1983 to 1998 General Household Surveys who report 
leaving full-time education at, or before, age 14.  The upper line shows 
the same, but for age 15. 
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Notes: The lower line shows the proportion of Northern Irish adults 
aged 16 to 65 from the 1985 to 1998 Continuous Household Surveys 
who report leaving full-time education at, or before, age 14.  The upper 
line shows the same, but for age 15. 
yearat14
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Fraction Left Full-Time Education by Year Aged 14 and 15 


























Notes: The lower line shows the proportion of Republic of Ireland 
adults aged 16 to 65 from the 1973 to 1998 Eurobarometer Surveys 
who report leaving full-time education at, or before, age 14.  The upper 
line shows the same, but for age 15. 
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Projected Log Earnings for Males with 15 and 16 Years of 

























Notes: Projections are based from regression log annual earnings for British 
adults aged 16 to 65 in the General Household Surveys with fixed effects for age 
and survey year.  A constant rate of return from schooling is assumed. 
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Notes: Projections are based from regression log annual earnings for British 
adults aged 16 to 65 in the General Household Surveys with fixed effects for age 
and survey year.  Age left school is instrumented on indicator variables for 
whether able to drop out at age 15 or at 16.  A constant rate of return from 
schooling is assumed
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Notes: Projections are based from regression log annual earnings for British 
adults aged 16 to 65 in the General Household Surveys with fixed effects for age 
and survey year.  Age left school is instrumented on indicator variables for 
whether able to drop out at age 15 or at 16.  The returns to education estimates 
vary between ages 25 to 35 35 to 45 and 55 to 65
age
 Left School at Age 15  Left School at Age 16








9.7(1) (2) (3) (4)
Minimum Cost-
Geometric Period Period to-Annual-Benefit
Discount Factor Schooling Gains Schooling Gains Ratio Required to
Begin End Prefer Dropping Out
0.99 1 50 38.5
0.95 1 50 17.5
0.9 1 50 8.5
0.99 10 50 24.2
0.95 10 50 9.5
0.9 10 50 3.4
Assuming Gains are Constant Each Period, and Schooling Choice in Period 0
Table 1
Minimum Well-Being Cost-to-Annual-Gains Ratio
Required for Decision to Decline Additional Schooling,
Notes: Calculations of column 4 follow equation (7) in the text, and assumptions given in columns 1 to 3.
R(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
School Leaving School Leaving OLS OLS: Age IV Initial Number of Number of
Dependent Variable Age: 15 Age: 16 Left School<17 Observations Groups Clusters
Log Family Income 0.0775 0.1021 0.0868 0.13 0.1353 61192 25545 3
(From Eurobarometers) (0.0124)*** (0.0176)*** (0.0077)*** (0.009)*** (0.0241)***
Log Individual Earnings 0.0628 0.1352 0.155 0.1375 145060 4184 2
(From General Household Surveys) (0.0210)** (0.0126)*** (0.0086)*** (0.0411)***
Log Individual Income 0.0606 0.1558 0.138 0.1241 206551 6482 2
(From Labour Force Surveys) (0.0067)*** (0.0204)*** (.0117)*** (0.0142)***
Reduced Form Coefficients Returns to Schooling
Table 2
The Effect of Schooling on Income and Earnings
Least Sqaures and IV Estimates using UK and Irish Changes in School Leaving Ages
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year.  Data are grouped into means by age, sex, birth year, nation, and survey year.  Huber-White standard errors are 
shown from clustering by nation. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. The two instruments are indicator variables for
whether able to drop out at age 15 or age 16. The ommited variable indicates whether able to drop out at age 14. Samples include all adults aged 18 to 65. Income and earnings are reported in the Eurobarometers, the
GHHS, and the LFS annually, weekly, and annually respectively.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean School Leaving OLS IV Number of Initial
Age: 15 Observations
General Household Survey
In Poor Health (Self-Reported) 0.097 -0.0177 -0.0096 -0.0373 262231
(0.0067)** (0.0022)*** (0.0153)**
In Good Health (Self-Reported) 0.660 0.0386 0.0279 0.0814 262231
(0.0111)*** (0.0059)*** (0.0260)***
Has Long-Standing Illness (Self-Reported) 0.303 -0.0101 -0.0092 -0.0209 277372
(0.005)** (0.0022)*** (0.0111)*
Labour Force Survey
Has a Health Problem or Disability 0.190 -0.0352 -0.0219 -0.0796 1732879
(0.0034)*** (0.0018)*** (0.0076)***
Health Problem is Depression 0.056 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0061 1213266
(0.0003)*** (0.0016)* (0.0006)***
General Household Survey
In Labor Force and Looking for Work 0.064 -0.0084 -0.003 -0.01892 207778
(0.005)* (0.0003)*** (0.003)***
Labour Force Survey
Looking for Different or Additional Job 0.034 -0.0071 -0.0104 -0.0159 1762982
(0.0013)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0030)***
Receiving Unempoyment Benefits 0.017 -0.0038 -0.0017 -0.0045 2630818
(0.0002)*** (0.0005)** (0.0006)***
Receiving Income Support 0.024 0.0003 -0.0039 -0.0107 1199065
(0.001) (0.0008)** (0.0174)
Eurobarometer Survey
Unemployed (Self-Reported) 0.042 -0.0307 -0.0031 -0.0187 89421
(0.0084)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0057)***
General Household Survey
Unskilled Manual  Occupation 0.058 -0.0315 -0.0109 -0.0603 263886
(0.0039)*** (0.0020)** (0.0069)***
Junior Non-Manual Occupation 0.207 0.0242 -0.0089 0.0463 263886
(0.0080)* (0.0024)** (0.0155)*
Skilled Manual Occupation 0.113 0.0152 -0.0196 0.0291 263886
(0.0048)** (0.0008)*** (0.0092)*
Manager or Employer Occupation 0.192 0.0079 0.0437 0.0152 263886
(0.0007)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0016)***
Labour Force Survey
Unskilled Occupation 0.030 -0.013 -0.008 -0.0115 1338958
(0.0005)*** (0.0010)*** (0.0005)***
Partly Skilled Occupation 0.081 -0.0201 -0.0168 -0.0147 1338958
(0.0005)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0065)**
Intermediate Occupation 0.445 0.013 0.0288 -0.001 1338958
(0.0030)** (0.0050)** -0.0262






The Effect of Schooling on Health, Labor Market Outcomes, and Occupation Composition
Least Sqaures and IV Estimates using UK and Irish Changes in School Leaving Ages
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year. Data are grouped into means by age, sex, birth year, nation,
and survey year. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by nation. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent,
5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.  Samples include all adults aged 18 to 65.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean School Leaving School Leaving OLS IV Initial
Age: 15 Age: 16 Observations
Life Satisfaction 3.14 0.03 0.0508 0.0429 0.059 30118
(1 = not at all satisfied, 4 = very satisfied) (0.0028)*** (0.0058)** (0.0091)** (0.0073)**
Satisfied with Life 0.86 0.0245 0.0555 0.0221 0.0516 89279
(1 = Very or Fairly Satisfied,0 = Not Satisfied (0.0028)** (0.0059)** (0.0032)*** (0.0033)***
or not at all satisfed)
Very Satisfied 0.325 0.006 0.0373 0.0218 0.0235 89279
(1 = Very Satisfied) (0.0071) (0.0158)** (0.0029)*** (0.0135)*
Happy 2.14 0.0379 0.1096 0.0318 0.0667 24565
(1 = Not So Happy, 2 = Fairly Happy, (0.0023)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0074)*** (0.0093)***
3 = Very Happy)
Table 4
The Effect of Schooling on Subjective Well-being
Least Sqaures and IV Estimates using UK and Irish Changes in School Leaving Ages
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year. Data are grouped into means by age, sex, birth year, nation, and survey
year. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by nation. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1
percent levels respectively.  Samples include all adults aged 18 to 65.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Nations Rep. Of Ireland, Grt. Britain, Rep. Of Ireland,
Grt. Britain N. Ireland N. Ireland
School Leaving Age: 16 0.0897 0.1213 0.0389
(0.0232)*** (0.0264)*** (0.0376)
School Leaving Age: 15 0.0792 0.094 0.099 0.0317
(0.0113)*** (0.0128)*** (0.0219)*** (0.0192)*
OLS coefficient for Age left School 0.0926 0.1 0.0949 0.0998
(0.0046)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0056)*** (0.0057)***
IV coefficient for Age left School 0.1403 0.1626 0.2359 0.0658
(0.0213)*** (0.0235)*** (0.0549)*** (0.0374)*
Initial Observations 61192 50645 34842 27895
Table 5
Reduced Form and Returns to Schooling Estimates
on Family Log Income, Different Country Control Groups
Log Family Income
Dependent Variable:
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year. Data are grouped
into means by age, sex, birth year, nation, and survey year. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by nation.
Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.
Samples include all adults aged 18 to 65.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Nations Rep. Of Ireland, Grt. Britain, Rep. Of Ireland,
Grt. Britain N. Ireland N. Ireland
School Leaving Age: 16 0.0549 0.0609 0.0405
(0.0105)*** (0.0122)*** (0.0155)***
School Leaving Age: 15 0.0241 0.027 0.0217 0.0164
(0.0052)*** (0.0061)*** (0.0101)** (0.0087)*
OLS coefficient for Age left School 0.0221 0.0249 0.0186 0.0206
(0.0020)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0025)*** (0.0025)***
IV coefficient for Age left School 0.0516 0.0549 0.0487 0.0424
(0.0105)*** (0.0119)*** (0.0229)** (0.0178)**
Initial Observations 89279 72592 48579 42497
Table 6
Reduced Form and Returns to Schooling Estimates
on Life Satisfaction, Different Country Control Groups
Satisfed with Life (1 = very or fairly satisfied, 0 = not very or not at all satisfied)
Dependent Variable:
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year. Data are grouped
into means by age, sex, birth year, nation, and survey year. Huber-White standard errors are shown from clustering by
nation. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels
respectively.  Samples include all adults aged 18 to 65.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3)
Adult Log Earnings Family Log Inome Satisfied with Life
(from GHHS) (from Eurobarometers)
School Leaving Age: 15 0.1005 0.0535 0.0124
(0.0071)*** (0.0173)*** (0.0079)
OLS coefficient for Age left School 0.1164 0.0923 0.0201
(0.0158)*** (0.0077)*** (0.0033)***
IV coefficient for Age left School 0.2035 0.1437 0.0322
(0.0157)*** (0.0461)*** (0.0205)
Initial Observations 31063 28648 39950
School Leaving Age: 15 0.0448 0.0463 0.0349
(0.0044)*** (0.0257)* (0.0126)***
OLS coefficient for Age left School 0.095 0.0866 0.024
(0.0285)*** (0.0063)*** (0.0033)***
IV coefficient for Age left School 0.1635 0.1109 0.0827
(0.0103)*** (0.0605)* (0.0322)**
Observations 30942 24338 35066
Year at 14: 1950 - 1970 (identification from N. Ireland's change in School Leaving Law)
Table 7
Reduced Form and Returns to Schooling Estimates
on Life Satisfaction, over different time periods
Year at 14: 1935 - 1955 (identification from Grt. Britain's change in School Leaving Law)
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey
year. Data are grouped into means by age, sex, birth year, nation, and survey year. Huber-White
standard errors are shown from clustering by nation. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate
significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. Samples include
all adults aged 18 to 65.  See text for more data specifics.  GHHS = General Household Surveys.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Finished Schooling Finished Schooling Full Finished Schooling Finished Schooling Full Finished Schooling Finished Schooling
Sample Age < 17 Age >= 17 Sample Age < 17 Age >= 17 Sample Age < 17 Age >= 17
School Leaving Age: 16 0.1059 0.1169 -0.046 0.0549 0.0873 0.0089
(0.0179)*** (0.0252)*** (0.0565) (0.0062)*** (0.0125)*** (0.0215)
School Leaving Age: 15 0.0625 0.1481 0.005 0.0842 0.0933 -0.041 0.0241 0.0325 0.0075
(0.0244)** (0.0310)*** (0.0073) (0.0131)*** (0.0117)*** (0.0277) (0.0028)*** (0.0060)*** (0.011)
Observations 145060 87825 57235 61192 47621 13571 89279 67416 21863
Satisfed with Life
Table 8
Reduced Form Estimates of Minimum Schooling Law Effects
on Life Satisfaction for Alternative Education Attainment Groups
Adult Log Earnings (From GHHS) Family Log Income (from Eurobarometers)
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year. Data are grouped into means by age, sex, birth year, nation, and survey year. Huber-White
standard errors are shown from clustering for by nation. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. Samples include all
adults aged 18 to 65.  See text for more data specifics. GHHS = General Household Surveys.(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV IV with IV with IV with
No Controls Individual Household Household Income
Earnings Controls Income Controls Controls, Truncated
Satisfied with Life 0.0522 NA 0.0426 0.0311
(from Eurobarometers) (0.0027)*** (0.0045)*** (0.0029)***
Good Health 0.0763 0.0603 0.0591 NA
(from General Household Surveys) (0.0253)*** (0.0079)*** (0.0185)***
Bad Health -0.0346 -0.0287 0.0013 NA
(from General Household Surveys) (0.0147)** (0.0032)*** (0.0135)
Watch TV -0.0195 0.0161 -0.0202 NA
(from General Household Surveys) (0.0088)** (0.0014)*** (0.0107)*
Table 9
Instrumental Variable Estimates of Education on Subjective Well-Being and Other Variables,
with and without Income Controls
Notes: All regressions include fixed effects for age, sex, birth year, and nation interacted with survey year. Huber-White standard
errors are shown from clustering by nation. Single, double, and triple asterix indicate significant coefficients at the 10 percent, 5
percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. Samples include all adults aged 18 to 65. The log of usual annual earnings was included in
the General Household Surveys in column 2 as a control variable. The regression used in column 3 includes log annual household
income for the General Household Surveys, and family income group indicators for the Eurobarometers. Column 4 truncates the
analysis to adults not reporting the highest or lowest family income group.  See text for more data specifics.(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Average Projected Maximum Projeced
Annual Earnings Annual Earnings
After Leaving School after Leaving School
at Age 15 at Age 15
(between age 16 to 20) [age max. achieved] 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.08
Present Value Gains from OLS Estimates 5,573 13,599 34,555 23,490 14,651 86,388 58,726 36,627
[43]
Present Value Gains from IV Estimates 4,907 12,475 31,907 21,540 13,323 79,768 53,851 33,308
[44]
PV Gains from IV Estimates, 7,941 16,678 34,411 26,150 18,477 86,029 65,374 46,192
Allowing Different Returns to Education over Age [53]
Assuming 8 percent return 4,907 12,475 20,123 13,585 8,403 50,308 33,962 21,006
[44]
Table 10
Estimated Present Value Gains from Additional Year of School
Evaluated at age 15, Measured in 1998 UK Pounds
Discount Rate
Financial Gains 40% of Total Gains
Discount Rate
Financial Gains 100% of Total Gains
Notes: Projected earnings between ages 16 to 65 from Figures 4, 5, and 6 are converted to present value (with base period beginning at age 15), with assumed discount rates shown. Age 15 Age 16 Age 15 Age 16
Want to Drop Out Dropped Out Want to Drop Out Want to Drop Out
at Age 16 Age 16 at Age 17 or 18 at Age 17 or 18
Life Satisfaction 3.30 2.97 3.39 3.24
(1 = not at all satisfied, 4 = very satisfied)
Satisfied with Life 0.91 0.80 0.94 0.94
(1 = Very or Fairly Satisfied,0 = Not Satisfied
or not at all satisfed)
Very Satisfied 0.39 0.20 0.44 0.29
(1 = Very Satisfied)
Monthly Funds Available (1990 pounds) 65.87 223.79 51.94 63.33
In Difficult Financial Situation? 0.26 0.37 0.14 0.16
Household Head? 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00
N 28 30 38 51
Table 11
British 15 to 16 Year-Old Students
With Constrained and Non-Constrained School Choices
Mean
Notes: Sample includes 16 to 25 year-olds in Britain from the 1990 Eurobarometer Youth Survey.  The minimum school-leaving age 
among these cohorts was 16.Finished School Finished School Finished School
Immediately at Min. 1 or 2 Years More Than 2
Schl. Leaving Age After Dropout Years After
Had Gone as Far as I Could 0.148 0.332 0.540
I Saw No Point in Going On 0.295 0.172 0.193
I Did Not Like It 0.243 0.114 0.040
I Needed Money 0.126 0.095 0.053
I Wanted to Work 0.445 0.437 0.293
Family Needed Mondey 0.039 0.034 0.013
Couldn’t Afford Course 0.009 0.019 0.013
Had to Bring Up Children 0.015 0.009 0.067
N 461 325 150
Table 12
Reasons for Leaving School Among 16 to 25 Year-Olds
Fraction Mentioning Reason
Notes: Sample includes 16 to 25 year-olds in Britain from the 1990 Eurobarometer Youth 
Survey.Left School Left School
1943-45 1949-51 Difference
1983-98 GHHS: Respondent Age 52-61 at Age 14 at Age 15
Predicted mean with survey year and age FE 9.394 9.540 0.146
1998, age 52 (se in parenthesis) (0.075)
Residual Standard Deviation 0.381 0.271 -0.110
F-test; P-Value (0.001)
Var(Dropout at 15) > Var(Dropout at 14)
Number of Respondents 1456 1024
(full sample)
Left School Left School
1968-70 1974-76 Difference
1983-98 GHHS: Respondent Age 29-37 at Age 15 at Age 16
Predicted mean with survey year and age FE 9.346 9.405 0.058
1998, age 29 (se in parenthesis) (0.043)
Residual Standard Deviation 0.335 0.328 -0.008
F-test; P-Value (0.136)
Var(Dropout at 16) > Var(Dropout at 15)
Number of Respondents 2260 2614
(full sample)
Table A1
Variances of Log Annual Earnings
(1998 UK pounds)
Among Working British Males who Finished School at Earliest Possible Age
Notes: All data are from the 1983-98 British General Household Surveys. Log weekly earnings are regressed on age, survey
year fixed effects, and age finished full time schooling. The variances of the residual earnings from these estimates are shown.
See text for details.